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Abstract
We provide explicit formulas for the nucleolus of an arbitrary assignment
game with two buyers and two sellers. Five different cases are analyzed
depending on the entries of the assignment matrix. We extend the results
to the case of 2×m or m× 2 assignment games.
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Resumen
En este art´ıculo hallamos fo´rmulas para el nucleolo de juegos de asig-
nacio´n arbitrarios con dos compradores y dos vendedores. Se analizan cinco
casos distintos, dependiendo de las entradas en la matriz de asignacio´n. Los
resultados se extienden a los casos de juegos de asignacio´n de tipo 2×m o
m× 2.
Palabras clave: juego de asignacio´n, nu´cleo, nucleolo
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1. Introduction
Assignment games were introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972). They
represent two-sided markets, whose agents are, let us say, buyers and sellers.
When a member of one side is paired with a member of the other side, a non-
negative real number is associated. It is the potential profit of that pairing.
This setup is represented by a matrix, namely the assignment matrix. The
worth of a coalition is defined as the maximum profit obtained by matching
buyers to sellers within the coalition.
Given an optimal matching, the main question at issue focuses on how
agents share the profit of the whole market. The core is the main solution
and it is defined as those allocations of the worth of the grand coalition such
that no subcoalition can improve upon. Shapley and Shubik prove that
the core of an assignment game is always a nonempty polyhedron which
coincides with the set of solutions of the dual linear program associated
with the (linear sum) optimal assignment problem. It can be described in
terms of the assignment matrix entries, that is, there is no need to compute
the characteristic function. Usually the core contains many points and it
becomes necessary to select one of them. One of the most outstanding core
selections is the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
The nucleolus corresponds with the unique core element that lexico-
graphically minimizes the vector of non-increasingly ordered excesses of
coalitions. For assignment games, only excesses of individual and mixed-pair
coalitions matter. Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) use this fact to provide
a specific algorithm that computes the nucleolus of an arbitrary square as-
signment game, but there is no explicit formula, even for assignment games
with few agents.
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Recently, Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) have characterized the nucleolus of
a square assignment game from a geometric point of view. Making use of
this geometric characterization we give specific formulae of the nucleolus for
2 × 2 assignment games. The paper is addressed to provide such formulae
and extend the above method to 2 × m or m × 2 assignment games. We
expect that this work be a basis to analyze the general case.
2. Preliminaries
An assignment market (M,M ′, A) is defined by two disjoint finite sets:
M, the set of buyers, and M ′, the set of sellers, and a non-negative matrix
A = (aij)i∈M,j∈M ′ which represents the profit obtained by each mixed-pair
(i, j) ∈ M ×M ′. To distinguish the j-th seller from the j-th buyer we will
write the former as j′ when needed.
A matching µ ⊆M×M ′ between M and M ′ is a bijection from M0 ⊆M
to M ′0 ⊆ M ′ such that |M0| = |M ′0| = min {|M | , |M ′|} . We write (i, j) ∈ µ
as well as j = µ (i) or i = µ−1 (j). If for some buyer i ∈M there is no j ∈M ′
such that (i, j) ∈ µ we say that i is unmatched by µ and similarly for sell-
ers. The set of all matchings from M to M ′ is represented by M (M,M ′) .
A matching µ ∈ M (M,M ′) is optimal for (M,M ′, A) if ∑(i,j)∈µ aij ≥∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij for any µ
′ ∈M (M,M ′) . We denote byM∗A (M,M ′) the set of
all optimal matchings. Shapley and Shubik (1972) associate to any assign-
ment market a game in coalitional form (M ∪M ′, wA) called the assignment
game where the worth of a coalition formed by S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ is
wA (S ∪ T ) = max
µ∈M(S,T )
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij , and any coalition formed by buyers or
sellers gets zero.
The core of the assignment game, C(wA), is defined as those allocations
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(u; v) ∈ RM × RM ′ satisfying u (M) + v (M ′) = wA (M ∪M ′) and u (S) +
v (T ) ≥ wA (S ∪ T ) for all S ⊆ M and T ⊆ M ′ where u (S) =
∑
i∈S ui,
v (T ) =
∑
j∈T vj , u (∅) = 0 and v (∅) = 0. It is always non-empty.
Given an optimal matching µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) , the core of the assignment
game can be easily described as the set of non-negative payoff vectors (u; v) ∈
Rm+ × Rm
′
+ such that
ui + vj ≥ aij for all i ∈M, j ∈M ′, (1)
ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ, (2)
and all agents unmatched by µ get a null payoff.
Now we define the nucleolus of an assignment game, taking into account
that its core is always non-empty. Given an allocation in the core, x ∈
C(wA), define for each coalition S its excess as e (S, x) := v (S) −
∑
i∈S xi.
As it is known (see Solymosi and Raghavan, 1994) that the only coalitions
that matter are the individual and mixed-pair ones, define the vector θ (x) of
excesses of individual and mixed-pair coalitions arranged in a non-increasing
order.
Then the nucleolus of the game (M ∪M ′, wA) is the unique alllocation
ν (wA) ∈ C(wA) which minimizes θ (x) with respect to the lexicographic
order over the set of core allocations.
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) characterize the nucleolus of a square assign-
ment game from a geometric point of view. The nucleolus is the unique al-
location that is the midpoint of some well-defined segments inside the core.
To be precise we define the maximum transfer from a coalition to their op-
timally assigned partners. Given any assignment market (M,M ′, A) , an
optimal matching µ ∈ M∗A (M,M ′) and an arbitrary coalition ∅ 6= S ⊆ M,
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we define
δAS,µ(S) (u; v) := min
i∈S, j∈M ′\µ(S)
{ui, ui + vj − aij} (3)
δAµ(S),S (u; v) := min
j∈µ(S),i∈M\S
{vj, ui + vj − aij} (4)
for any core allocation (u; v) ∈ C (wA).
It is easy to see that expression (3) represents the largest amount that
can be transferred from players in S to players in µ (S) with respect to the
core allocation (u; v) while remaining in the core, that is,
δAS,µ(S) (u; v) = max
{
ε ≥ 0 | (u− ε1S ; v + ε1µ(S)) ∈ C (wA)} ,
where 1S and 1µ(S) represent the characteristic vectors1 associated with
coalition S ⊆M and µ (S) ⊆M ′, respectively.
Llerena and Nu´n˜ez (2011) prove that the nucleolus of a square assignment
market is characterized as the unique core allocation (u; v) ∈ C(wA) where
δAS,µ(S) (u; v) = δ
A
µ(S),S (u; v) for any ∅ 6= S ⊆M and µ ∈M∗A (M,M ′) , what
we name the bisection property.
3. Main results
Consider the 2× 2 assignment market represented by a matrix
A =
 a11 a12
a21 a22
 ,
and denote by M+2 the set of all these matrices with non-negative entries.
From now on and without loss of generality, we assume that the following
1Given S ⊆ N = {1, . . . , n} , 1S ∈ Rn is such that 1S,i = 1, if i ∈ S, and zero otherwise.
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normalization conditions hold:
a11 + a22 ≥ a12 + a21,
a11 ≥ a22, a12 ≥ a21. (5)
These conditions mean that the main diagonal is optimal and is sorted from
highest to lowest. Sectors are interchangeable so that the entries outside the
main diagonal are ordered.
Our main results (Theorem 3.1 and 3.2) provide the expression of the
nucleolus of an arbitrary 2×2 assignment game. We show that there are five
different cases, depending on some linear inequalities concerning the matrix
entries.
Their proofs rely on the characterization of the nucleolus given by Llerena
and Nu´n˜ez (2011). Recall that if (M,M ′, A) is a square assignment market
|M | = |M ′| = 2, a core allocation (u; v) = (u1, u2; v1, v2) ∈ C (wA) is the
nucleolus of (M ∪M ′, wA) if and only if
δ{1},{1′} (u; v) = δ{1′},{1} (u; v) ,
δ{2},{2′} (u; v) = δ{2′},{2} (u; v) , and
δ{1,2},{1′,2′} (u; v) = δ{1′,2′},{1,2} (u; v) .
Equivalently, using (3) and (4) the above conditions can be written as:
min {u1, u1 + v2 − a12} = min {v1, v1 + u2 − a21} ≥ 0, (6)
min {u2, u2 + v1 − a21} = min {v2, v2 + u1 − a12} ≥ 0, (7)
min {u1, u2} = min {v1, v2} . (8)
being vi = aii − ui for i = 1, 2.
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The following theorems state formulae for the nucleolus of an arbitrary
2× 2 assignment game. In its description we only make explicit the buyers’
components, being the sellers’ ones easily computed applying (2).
Theorem 3.1. Let A ∈ M+2 satisfying the normalization conditions (5) and
let dA = a11 + a22 − a12 − a21. If
a21 > min
{
a22
2
,
dA
2
}
,
the nucleolus of the assignment game is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) , where v∗i =
aii − u∗i for i = 1, 2 and
(i) (u∗1, u∗2) =
(
a11
2 +
a12
2 − a212 , a222
)
, if a21 ≥ a12 + a22 − a11,
(ii) (u∗1, u∗2) =
(
a11 −
(
a21
2 +
dA
4
)
, a212 +
dA
4
)
, if a21 < a12 + a22 − a11.
Proof. Case (i): We have to check that the nucleolus is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) =(
a11
2 +
a12
2 − a212 , a222 ; a112 − a122 + a212 , a222
)
.
We claim that
u∗1 ≥ v∗1 ≥ u∗2 = v∗2 =
a22
2
and v∗1 ≥ u∗1 + v∗2 − a12 = u∗2 + v∗1 − a21 =
dA
2
.
The first inequality comes from the normalization condition, a12 ≥ a21 and
the second one from a21 ≥ a12 + a22 − a11.
To prove the third inequality, notice that if min
{
a22
2 ,
dA
2
}
= a222 , we
have a21 > a222 , and else, if min
{
a22
2 ,
dA
2
}
= d
A
2 , we have a22 ≥ dA and since
a21 ≥ a12 + a22 − a11 ≥ a12 + dA − a11 = a22 − a21, we obtain also that
a21 ≥ a222 . Therefore, in any case, a21 ≥ a222 , and v∗1 = a112 − a122 + a212 =
dA − a222 + a21 ≥ dA. From our claim, it is immediate to check (6) to (8).
Case (ii): We have to check that the nucleolus is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) =(
a11 −
(
a21
2 +
dA
4
)
, a212 +
dA
4 ;
a21
2 +
dA
4 , a22 −
(
a21
2 +
dA
4
))
.
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We claim that
u∗1 ≥ v∗2 ≥ u∗2 = v∗1 ≥ u∗1 + v∗2 − a12 = u∗2 + v∗1 − a21 =
dA
2
.
The first inequality comes from the normalization conditions a11 ≥ a22. The
second one comes from a21 < a12 + a22 − a11 = a22 − dA + a22 − a21, and
then a21 + d
A
2 < a22.
For the third inequality, notice that in this case min
{
a22
2 ,
dA
2
}
= d
A
2 ,
because if this were not the case, we would have d
A
2 >
a22
2 and a21 >
min
{
a22
2 ,
dA
2
}
= a222 , obtaining a contradiction with a21 +
dA
2 < a22. There-
fore a21 > d
A
2 . Checking the equalities (6) to (8) is immediate.
Theorem 3.2. Let A ∈ M+2 satisfying the normalization conditions (5) and
let dA = a11 + a22 − a12 − a21. If
a21 ≤ min
{
a22
2
,
dA
2
}
,
the nucleolus of the assignment game is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) , where v∗i =
aii − u∗i for i = 1, 2 and
(i) (u∗1, u∗2) =
(
a11
2 ,
a22
2
)
, if a12 ≤ a222 ,
(ii) (u∗1, u∗2) =
(
a11
2 +
a12
2 − a224 , a222
)
, if a222 < a12 ≤ a11− a222 ,
(iii) (u∗1, u∗2) =
(
a11 −
(
a21
3 +
dA
3
)
, a213 +
dA
3
)
, if a11 − a222 < a12.
Proof. Case (i): We have to check that the nucleolus is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) =(
a11
2 ,
a22
2 ;
a11
2 ,
a22
2
)
.
All equalities are immediate to prove, taking into account the normal-
ization conditions (5) and a12 ≤ a222 .
Case (ii): We have to check that the nucleolus is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) =(
a11
2 +
a12
2 − a224 , a222 ; a112 − a122 + a224 , a222
)
.
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We claim that
u∗1 ≥ v∗1 ≥ u∗2 = v∗2 =
a22
2
≥ 0 and u∗2 + v∗1 − a21 ≥ v∗1 = u∗1 + v∗2 − a12.
The first two inequalities come from a222 < a12 ≤ a11 − a222 . The third
inequality uses that a21 ≤ a222 = u∗2. From our claim, it is immediate to
check (6) to (8).
Case (iii): We have to check that the nucleolus is ν(wA) = (u∗1, u∗2; v∗1, v∗2) =(
a11 −
(
a21
3 +
dA
3
)
, a213 +
dA
3 ;
a21
3 +
dA
3 , a22 −
(
a21
3 +
dA
3
))
.
We claim that
u∗1 ≥ v∗2 ≥ u∗2 = v∗1 = u∗1 + v∗2 − a12 and u∗2 + v∗1 − a21 ≥ v∗1.
The first inequality comes from the normalization condition a11 ≥ a22. The
second inequality is a consequence of a11−a222 < a12, which implies a213 +d
A
3 =
a11+a22−a12
3 <
a22
2 .
For the third inequality, notice that from the hypothesis of the theorem
a21 ≤ dA2 , and therefore we obtain u∗2 + v∗1 − a21 = dA −
(
a21
3 +
dA
3
)
≥
a21
3 +
dA
3 = v
∗
1. Now, from our claim, equalities (6) to (8) are immediate.
We can use appropiately the 2×2 case to enlarge the class of assignment
games where we can give a formula for the calculation of the nucleolus. For
2 × m (or m × 2) assignment games (for m > 2), the computation of the
nucleolus can be carried out by reducing appropriately to a 2× 2 case. The
method is as follows.
Let
A =
 a11 a12 a13 · · · a1m
a21 a22 a23 · · · a2m

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denote the original matrix. Without loss of generality we may assume that
µ = {(1, 1) , (2, 2)} is an optimal matching. Notice that non-assigned sellers
get zero at any core allocation.
Let us denote by p∗1 = max {a13, . . . , a1m}, and p∗2 = max {a23, . . . , a2m}
and now define a 2× 2 assignment matrix in the following way:
A˜ =
 a˜11 a˜12
a˜21 a˜22

where a˜ij = max {0, aij − p∗i } for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2.
We know that νi(wA) = νi(wA˜) + p
∗
i , for i = 1, 2 and νj(wA) = νj(wA˜),
for j = 1, 2 and νj(wA˜) = 0 for j = 3, . . . ,m. This method can be used since
non optimally-matched sellers receive zero payoff in any core allocation, and
so in the nucleolus. Matrix A˜ basically represents the reduced assignment
game when sellers 3 to m leave the market with zero payoff. For more details
see Llerena et al. (2012).
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